1 We thank seminar participants at MIT for helpful comments.
constant many more features of elections. In addition, we can estimate the normal party vote for each state in each year, without relying on lagged dependent variables or the limited time series of state level surveys. Our approach further allows us to examine directly the association between the strength of incumbency and the strength of party in each state, and the correlation between these two factors over time.
The paper documents that all executive and legislative o±ces|from utility commissioner to Governor, from state legislator to Senator|have experienced a similar electoral transformation since World War II. Across all o±ces incumbency advantages have risen in magnitude and in relative importance as predictors of the vote. We also show that the normal party vote has come to explain a smaller fraction of the variation in the vote across o±ces and states. And, there has been a general rise in the relative importance in short-term, local factors, which comprise the residual component in our model. The residual is of particular importance because it captures much of the risk that incumbents face, and, since the 1960s, it has been the single largest component of the vote. The causes of this change are less clear, and deserve further study.
Ultimately, the motivation for this study is to gain insight about the factors that might cause rising incumbency advantages. Comparison of incumbency advantages across a wide range of executive and legislative o±ces allows us to assess the plausibility of several important strains of thought.
We test three ideas. The¯rst is that the structure of politics gives legislators higher incumbency advantages than executives. The literature on the incumbency advantage focuses on causes that are unique to legislatures or are shared by all o±ces. And, the literature on gubernatorial elections o®er various arguments why incumbent governors are electorally more vulnerable than legislators.
3 The second idea is that party decline causes rising incumbency 3 Fiorina (1989) and Lowenstein (1992) provide excellent surveys of the search for the causes of the incumbency advantage. Ranney (1965, page 91) , Schlesinger (1960 Schlesinger ( , 1966 , Seroka (1980, page 161), and Turett (1971, pages 108-112) discuss the electoral problems incumbent governors face. Empirical studies, however, are mixed. Chubb (1988) and Hinkley (1970) ¯nd little or no incumbency advantages for governor, while Turett (1971) , Pierson (1977) , and Tompkins (1984) ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects. Research advantages. Psychologically, party and incumbency are thought to be con°icting voting cues, and rising incumbency advantages in the House occur in an era of declining party. 4 The third idea is that declining challenger quality has driven incumbency advantages up. Challenger political experience is an important predictor of the vote in House and Senate elections.
Researchers have hypothesized that average quality has fallen or that voters respond more to candidate quality now than they did in the past.
5
We¯nd little support that these arguments can account for the rise of the incumbency advantage. There is nothing distinctive about legislative elections. Instead, there is a remarkable similarity in the incumbency advantages of most o±ces, both in magnitude and patterns of growth. Declining loyalty to parties looks more plausible, as party e®ects shrink over time, while incumbency grows. However, there is no association in the cross section between party e®ects and incumbency across o±ces, and there is small drop in the e®ect of party identi¯cation on the vote at the individual level. Rather, the decline of party mainly re°ects changing partisan divisions within the states. Finally, inclusion of indicators of challenger quality does not a®ect the estimated incumbency advantage, and indicators of challenger quality show no trend in statewide elections from the 1940s to the 1990s. This is not to say that these factors do not a®ect elections. Rather, these three ideas do not appear to explain the main variation in the incumbency advantage.
The central pattern is that incumbency advantages in all statewide o±ces, as well as the comparing Senators and governors tends to¯nd that Senators face better electoral circumstances and thus tend to have higher incumbency advantages (Hinkley, 1970; Hinkley, Hofstetter, and Kessel, 1974; Seroka, 1980; Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . The exception is Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) , who¯nd that governors and Senators have comparable and large incumbency advantages. 4 Again, the focus of this literature is legislative elections. Kostroski (1973) observed a pattern similar to that described in Figure 3 below for the Senate and attributes it to party dealignment. Erikson (1972) , Burnham (1974 ), Ferejohn (1977 , Nelson (1978-79) and Romero and Sanders (1994) also argue that party dealignment caused higher incumbency advantages in House elections. Krehbiel and Wright (1983) argue that declining loyalty of voters explains the growth of the incumbency advantage in House elections.
5 Jacobson (1980) shows the importance of challenger quality. But, the literature on whether this could account for changes in incumbency advantages is mixed. Canon (1990) documents the average challenger experience has trended up. Cox and Katz (1996) argue that the coe±cient on challenger quality has changed. Hinkley (1980) , Krasno (1994) and others argue that challenger quality is lower in the House than in the Senate, and thus explains much of the di®erence between the House and Senate elections. The organization of this paper is as follows. We,¯rst, describe the methods and data used. Second, we present estimates of the incumbency advantage across many o±ces. We, then, discuss the components of the vote derived from analysis of variance and decompose those components into some of their elements. Fourth, we consider theoretical arguments about the incumbency advantage in light of these data. Finally, we o®er concluding remarks to stimulate future theoretical and empirical inquiry.
Data and Methods
We exploit the panel-data structure of three features of American elections. First, the U.S. holds many elections within a given jurisdicition at once. Second, the U.S. holds many elections for any one type of o±ce (e.g., state legislature, U.S. House, or governor) at one time. Third, the U.S. holds elections in even years and at regular intervals over time.
Many studies exploit one of these features. The methods commonly used to study incumbency advantages use over-time or cross-sectional variation in races for a particular type of o±ce. For example, histograms and regression analyses exploit the cross-sectional variation, and Slump, Surge, and related measures exploit variation in the time-series. Some studies of state legislative elections make comparisons across states. This is the¯rst paper to exploit completely the variation across o±ces, across states, and over time.
Using all three features of the data provides unique leverage in estimating incumbency and party e®ects. To estimate incumbency e®ects, we can use a simple and intuitive di®erences estimator across states within o±ces and over time within o±ces. In each state, we compare the vote-share received by each party's incumbents to the vote-share received by the party's non-incumbents who are running at the same time and in the same state. We then average these di®erences across groups of states, or groups of years, to obtain more precise estimates.
To estimate party normal votes within each state, we use¯xed-e®ects for states and years.
The panel structure allows us to estimate the average party division within each state in each year, holding constant incumbency e®ects, national tides andother factors. Importantly, we do not require additional measures of partisanship, such as surveys or presidential vote. To test speci¯c hypotheses about the incumbency advantage, such as di®erences across types of o±ces or the importance of challenger quality or state size, we can use tests based on simple di®erences-in-di®erences.
Our approach corrects several well known problems with other estimators. First, it does not rely on lagged vote to identify and hold constant the normal vote. Slump, surge, and regression models rely on lagged vote. The problem with the lagged variable is that it contains the incumbency advantage plus any short-term shock that allowed the sitting incumbent to win: this is potentially a source of selection biases. Second, we do not su®er from the limits of survey based measures of the party division within each state. Survey based measures necessarily include measurement error|the sampling error associated with the survey quantities. If the sample sizes are small, the measurement error can be quite large. In multivariate regressions, this can bias all coe±cients.
One contribution of this project is that we have assembled a comprehensive data base on all statewide elected o±ces, including lieutenant governors, attorneys general, secretaries of state, auditors and treasurers, judges, and various commissioners, in addition to U.S. Senate, governor, U.S. House, and state legislators.
Data
We study all statewide partisan elected o±ces over the period 1942-2000, and also all U.S. House elections over the same period. In addition, we study state legislative elections over the period . Collecting the data on statewide elections is tedious, and must be done state by state.
6 The main data sources are shown in Appendix Following the main current of the incumbency advantage literature, we study vote-shares.
We wish to estimate the normal party vote, the incumbency advantage in vote margin, the e®ect of national tides on the vote, and the unexplained component in the vote. In this respect, we follow directly from work on decomposition of the vote (Stokes, 1965 ) and on estimating the incumbency advantage (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Brady, 1989; Gelman and King, 1990; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997) . Alternatively, we could study re-election rates.
Study of re-election rates involves rede¯nition of several concepts, such as normal vote, and presents several methodological problems, such as heterogeneity in the standard deviations, which are best estimated using the votes. In this respect, studying the votes is the¯rst step to understanding reelection probabilities.
7 Figure 1 graphs the Democrat's share of the two-party vote in all statewide races in our study, for each decade in our study. This is our dependent variable. The¯gures are analogous to Mayhew's famous diagram of vanishing marginals (Mayhew 1974a) . Unlike
Mayhew's diagram, no dip in the middle of the distribution appears. However the spread in the distributions in Figure 1 does not increase over time. In addition, the marginals never vanished in state elections. The percent of elections that are \marginal"|Democratic vote share between 45 percent and 55 percent|is 41 pecent in the 1940s and 1950s, 42 percent 6 We strongly suspect that this is the main reason no one appears to have done this before. 7 There is some confusion in the literature between vote margin and reelection probabilities. The belief that governors, Senators, and House members have di®ering incumbency advantages emerges from the study of reelection rates. The observation that incumbency advantages have grown dramatically emanates from the study of vote margins. Reelection rates have not changed as much as vote margins, owing in part to the non-linear relationship between them (e.g., Kendall and Stuart 1950) . Other issues to resolve in the study of re-election rates involve the di®erence between survival rates and reelection rates (Glazer and Grofman 1987) . 
Speci¯cation
We estimate three di®erent speci¯cations. Let i index o±ces, j index states, and t index years. Let V ijt be the share of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate running for o±ce i in state j in year t. Let I ijt = 1 if the Democratic candidate running for o±ce i in state j in year t is an incumbent, let I ijt = ¡1 if the Republican candidate running for o±ce i in state j in year t is an incumbent, and let I ijt = 0 if the contest for o±ce i in state j in year t is an open-seat race.
8 The speci¯cations are as follows:
Model (1) includes separate year and state¯xed-e®ects. The state¯xed-e®ects capture the underlying partisanship (normal vote) in each state, and the year¯xed-e®ects capture national tides. This is analagous to the speci¯cation used by Levitt and Wolfram (1997) .
Model (2) includes state-times-year¯xed-e®ects. This is a version of the di®erences estimator discussed above. Model (3) includes a direct measure of state partisanship P jt , which varies over time, plus year¯xed-e®ects. Note that in this model we can allow the parameters to vary across o±ces (that is, we can estimate the model separately for senators, governors, lieutenant governors, and so on). In all models we can allow the parameters to change over longer periods of time|we typically allow them to change every decade.
Model (1) is more parsimonious than (2), requiring the estimation of many fewer parameters. However, (1) is an incorrect speci¯cation if, for example, partisanship has a trend and moves in di®erent ways in di®erent states. This is potentially a serious issue for our study, since the south and some western states have become much more Republican over the course of the post-war period, while the northeast and other western states have become noticeably more Democratic. One way to alleviate the problem is to allow the state¯xed-e®ects to vary over decades. This is the approach taken by Levitt and Wolfram, and we adopt it as well.
Comparing the estimates from (1) and (2) allows us to check how well this strategy works.
We do not need a direct measure of state or district partisanship in order to estimate the overall size of the incumbency advantage, since we can use model (1) We estimate models (1)- (3) separately for six di®erent decades, the 1940's, 1950's, 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's (the 1940's cover 1942-1950, the 1950's cover 1952-1960 , and so on). We do not allow the incumbency advantage to vary across all statewide o±ces, because many of these o±ces are only elected in a few states|for example, only¯ve states had an elected Labor Commissioner at some point during the post-war period, only three states had an elected Commissioner or Inspector of Mines, and only two states had an elected State Printer (see Table A We also want to compare our results for statewide o±ces with those for the U.S. House, since so much of the previous literature has focused on the House. To do this, we estimate a modi¯ed version of speci¯cation (1) in which district-speci¯c¯xed-e®ects are used in place of the state-speci¯c¯xed-e®ects. This is the basic model in Levitt and Wolfram (1997) .
We use an analogous model to study state legislative elections for the period 1972-2000.
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We only include single-member district races. 12 Also, as in King (1991) , Morgenstern (1993, 1995) and others, we focus on the lower houses. Data for the period are from the commonly used data set, State Legislative Election Returns in the United States, 1968-1989, ICPSR #8907. We collected the data for the period 1990-2000 ourselves, from the various sources listed in Table A .1.
Finally, we use data from various National Election Studies to study how the relationship between party, incumbency, and voting has changed over time at the individual-level. The NES only contains voting data for Governor, U.S. Senator, and U.S. House Representative.
13
As before, let i index o±ces, j index states, and t index years. In addition, let k index voters.
Let V kijt = 1 if voter k votes for the Democratic candidate running in state j in year t; V kijt = 0 if voter k votes for the Republican. Let I jt =1 if the Democratic candidate running in state j in year t is an incumbent, let I ijt = ¡1 if the Republican candidate running in state j in year t is an incumbent, and let I ijt = 0 if the contest in state j in year t is an open-seat race.
Finally, let P kj be the party identi¯cation of voter k in state j . We estimate probit equations of the form
where © is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We estimate equation (4) separately for each o±ce (as the notation implies) and each decade.
Comparing Measures of the Normal Vote
One methodological note concerns the appropriate measure of the normal vote. Normal vote is the underlying party division in the electorate (Converse, 1966) . This is a theoretical concept. It captures how we expect voters to vote in the absence of incumbents, short-term shocks, and other factors.
Three common measures of the normal vote in the study of elections are the lagged vote for an o±ce, the average vote for a given o±ce overtime, and the presidential vote.
Lagged vote is used to capture variation within incumbents (Erikson 1971) . Lagged vote is likely a poor proxy for the normal vote, because it includes who won the seat last time (the incumbency e®ect) as well as idiosyncratic factors from the last election. It be adjusted, say by including indicators for who won last time (Gelman and King, 1990 ). 14 Presidential vote 13 Also, this is self-reported vote data, which has well known problems of accuracy. 14 Solid theoretical and statistical foundations for adjusting the vote do not yet exist. See the discussion is sometimes used to proxy for the normal vote because that is only national elected o±ce, and voters evaluate the parties' standard bearers. The problem with presidential vote is that it re°ects idiosyncratic factors in that election. Also, presidential vote re°ects national party and ideological divisions, rather than state party divisions. The average vote most closely captures the idea of the normal vote. One theoretical justi¯cation is that in a Markov model of elections the long-run average will converge to the normal vote (Stokes and Iverson 1962) .
Party divisions, however, are not necessarily stable overtime.
An important innovation, developed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) , is the use of state-level surveys to measure the normal vote. Assuming no survey biases, these polls capture the party division in the state. Survey measures are limited, however, by the number of states in which surveys are available and to the years for which such data are available.
In this paper, we introduce another approach to estimating the normal vote, which builds on Levitt and Wolfram's (1997) model. With many o±ces running at the same time, the normal vote is the average division of the vote across o±ces, holding¯xed incumbency and national tides (see also the statistical de¯nition of the normal vote in Gelman and King (1990) ). The normal vote, then, is captured by the state-decade¯xed-e®ects in speci¯cation
(1) and the state-year¯xed-e®ects in speci¯cation (2). The correlation between the¯xed-e®ects from speci¯cations (1) and (2) is .95 or higher in every decade in our study. 15
Our estimates are highly correlated with the survey estimates of the party division. The correlation of the¯xed-e®ects from speci¯cation (1) with the survey measures compiled by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) is .83 for the 1970s, .81 for the 1980s, and .80 for the 1990s. The corresponding correlations using the¯xed-e®ects from speci¯cation (2) are .79 for the 1970s, .85 for the 1980s, and .76 for the 1990s. These are reasonably high in Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000) and Gelman, et al, (1995) . Also, one cannot estimate the magnitude of the e®ect of party division on the vote. 15 We have one¯xed-e®ect per decade for each state from speci¯cation (1). To compare across speci¯cations, we average the¯xed-e®ects from speci¯cation (2) for each state across the years of each decade to create a set of decade averages. We also construct decade averages of the presidential vote and the survey-based party identi¯cation measure to calculate the correlations reported below.
reliabilities, especially considering that the survey data also contain measurement error due to the sampling error. This suggests that our approach o®ers a valid way to estimate state normal votes when survey data are not available.
Comparison with presidential vote looks quite di®erent. The correlations of the presidential vote with the¯xed-e®ects from speci¯cation (1) Statewide O±cers. These di®ererences are statistically highly signi¯cant (see Table A .2). 
The Growth of Incumbency Advantages

Incumbency, Party, and Short-term Forces
A simple analysis of variance puts the incumbency e®ects in context of other factors shaping elections. Our statistical speci¯cations divide the variation in the vote into three components: that due to incumbency, that due to party, and that due to residual or risk.
The party component itself consists of two factors. National tides capture the extent to which all members of a party rise and fall together, and normal votes capture the average behavior of voters in a state or district. This is similar to Stokes (1965) . These are similar to the average estimates in King (1991) and Cox and Morgenstern (1993) . This is not too surprising, since we use the Levitt and Wolfram model, and King and Cox and Morgenstern use the Gelman and King (1990) model, and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) showed that their model produces broadly similar results to the Gelman and King model for the U.S. House. It is comforting nonetheless.
(one for each o±ce), (ii) the state¯xed-e®ects, (iii) the year¯xed-e®ects, and (iv) the residual. Each state's¯xed-e®ect captures the normal vote or underlying partisanship in the state; the year-e®ects capture national partisan tides; and the residual o®ers a measure of short-term and local variation, which gauges candidates' electoral risk. We then compare the estimates across regions for two categories of o±ce|High (Senator, Governor and Higher Executive) and Low (Lower Executive). We¯nd no substantively large di®erences between southern and non-southern states. Comparable changes in incumbency, party, and residual factors occur in the South and outside the South in the 1960s. This is not to deny the importance of changing race relations and other issues. Rather, we believe that these important issues transformed the entire nation, not just the South.
Accounting for Components of the Vote
Three factors account for almost all of the variation in the vote: normal vote, incumbency, and the residual. National tides account for a very small share of the variation in the vote. The relative importance of the normal vote, incumbency, and the residual change dramatically from the 1940s to the 1990s.
To get a better sense of why these changes occur, we analyze the components of the vote further. The variation in the vote explained by either the party or incumbency consists of two factors: the variation in the independent variable in question and the square of the estimated e®ect. Each is substantively important. Changes in the variation in the independent variable re°ects changes in the independent variable, namely, changing distributions of party divisions across states or changing rates of incumbent-contested races. Changes in the coe±cients re°ect changes in the voters' response to party and incumbency.
First, consider incumbency. Incumbency e®ects rose in both magnitude and relative importance. The average incumbency coe±cent grew from .02 to .08, a four fold increase.
The percent of the variance attributable to incumbency grew more than 15 fold, from about 2 percent to over 30 percent. The change in the coe±cient accounts for most of the increase in variance explained. The squared coe±cient grows 13 fold|from .0004 to .0064. To verify that the incidence of incumbent contested races did not change, we regressed the percent of seats with an incumbent running on time. There is no evidence of a statistically signi¯cant trend over time.
The implication of this pattern is that voters respond more to incumbency today than they did 50 years ago. Many previous studies have documented the increased magnitude of the coe±cient on incumbency. Our decomposition suggests that this change in the coe±cient accounts for virtually all of the increase in the relative importance of incumbency.
Second, consider party. The percent of variance explained by party drops from over 50 percent in the 1940s to only 15 percent today. How much of the change is due to declining voter loyalty, and how much to changing party divisions within states? The change appears to be driven mainly by the latter.
To assess whether party loyalty has changed, we analyze survey data from the National Election Survey for each election from 1956 through 1998. We conduct probit analyses to predict respondent's reported votes for U.S. Senate, governor, and U.S. House using party, incumbency, and year e®ects. The literature often misinterprets the declining predictive power of party as decline party loyalty (e.g., Kostroski, 1973) . It is not. Instead, our analysis of the party component reveals that the change in the predictive power owes to the shift in most states toward more competitive statewide elections.
Equally dramatic as the changes in party and incumbency is the sudden rise in the relative importance of the residual component. The rise in the percent of variance explained by the residual might re°ect the dramatic drop in the variation due to party, and the resulting drop in the total variance. Alternatively, it might re°ect a true increase in the variation in the vote due to local, idiosyncratic factors. There are also intriguing di®erences across o±ces. Senators and governors have much higher residual variance than other statewide elected o±cials and than House incumbents. This is somewhat surprising because all statewide o±ces run in the same constituency, and because Senators and governors are considerably better known than other statewide o±cials.
Perhaps, their public salience brings both bene¯ts and risks.
Substantively, the residual component is di±cult to interpret. It may re°ect factors that the candidates observe and might even control, but that social scientist have not yet measured. For example, the residual might capture the incumbents' ideological¯t with the constituency or unmeasured aspects of candidate quality.
Alternatively, the residual might re°ect factors that the candidates cannot control, observe, or anticipate|incumbents' \electoral risk."
17 Mann (1978) and Jacobson (1987) argue that even though incumbent voter margins have grown, politicians face higher risk. has dropped back to the levels that it was at in the 1950s. The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic components of all other o±ces remained high compared to the 1950s.
Implications for Theories of the Incumbency Advantage
An extensive literature examines a wide array factors conjectured to explain the incumbency advantage. Comparison of the estimates derived from our analysis is revealing about three broad sorts of explanations: legislative politics, challenger quality, and declining party loyalty.
17 It may be interesting to model electoral risk as diversi¯able and not diversi¯able by regressing percent change in the Democratic vote for any one o±ce holder on percent change in the national Democratic share of the vote.
Legislative Politics
Much theorizing about the incumbency advantage focuses on factors speci¯c to legislatures, and sometimes to the U.S. House. Redistricting reputedly became an \incumbency protection plan" (Erikson, 1972; Tufte 1972 Tufte , 1973 Tufte , 1974 . Legislators can take popular positions on many issues, and avoid taking stands on controversial ones (Mayhew, 1974b) .
Legislative logrolls and pork barrel politics allow individual politicians to target special programs for their districts without having to bear the direct cost of sacri¯cing programs for other constituents or raising taxes (Fiorina, 1980; Bickers and Stein, 1994; Alvarez and Saving, 1997; Levitt and Snyder, 1997) . Seniority and committee systems force voters to continue voting for their incumbents so that they can gain the rank necessary to have significant in°uence over policy (McKelvey and Riezman, 1992) . Legislators devote considerable time and resources to casework, and even use the bureaucracy as a convenient scapegoat and source of casework (Fiorina, 1977; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987) . Summarizing this literature, Lowenstein (1992) It may still be true that casework and other o±ce resources explain the magnitude and growth of the incumbency advantage. However, for that to be an adequate explanation, all o±ces must experience a rise in the resources at their disposal and the casework that they do. In any case, it is di±cult to see how attorney generals, secretaries of state, state treasurers, and other executives can use the bureaucracy as a scapegoat as e®ectively as legislators|after all, they are the top bureacrats. Careful study of these factors awaits further investigation.
Challenger Quality
Growth in incumbents' vote margins may re°ect the opposition they face. Challengers who have previously held prominent political o±ces are thought to be especially strong opponents { for example, Senators running for governor. The incidence of such challengers may partly explain rising incumbency advantages (Canon, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996) . Challenger quality is also widely held to account for di®erences in the reelection rates of House Representatives and Senators (Mann and Wol¯nger, 1980; Hinckley, 1980; Abramowitz, 1988; Abramowitz and Segal, 1992; Westlye, 1991; Kranso, 1994; Gronke, 2000) .
To test for this possibility, we include indicators for statewide o±cers, U.S. Senators, and U.S. House members challenging statewide incumbents. The results are displayed in Table   A .5 in the appendix. Statewide candidates are somewhat better opponents than other challengers, though most of these e®ects are statistically insigni¯cant. Importantly, the inclusion of the indicators for challenger quality does not change the estimated incumbency advatange in each decade. Including the challenger quality variables increases the incumbency advantage estimates by at most one percentage point.
We further analyze the e®ect of challenger quality on incumbeny advantage estimates in the U.S. House. Here, we use Jacobson's (1980) indicator of challenger quality. To the extent that voters respond to incumbency, the argument goes, they must turn away from collective interests (Fiorina, 1980) . Likewise, declining loyalty to parties in the 1960s allegedly precipitated the rise of candidate-centered campaigning and an era of high incumbency advantages (Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1980; Wattenberg, 1984; Jacobson, 1990; Aldrich and Niemi 1996) . These arguments suggest a strong, causal connection between incumbency and party., At¯rst blush, the connection between incumbency and party looks quite strong. In Closer consideration of the data raises doubts about the argument that lower party e®ects cause higher incumbency advantages (or vice versa). If the association between party and incumbency is a strong one, then we expect that it will be evident across o±ces as well as over time in the aggregate data and that the same pattern shown in Figure 3 will be evident in the NES survey data.
To test the association between party and incumbency in the aggregate data, we examined the estimated e®ects for across all o±ces in the most recent decades using speci¯cation 3 with the survey measure of party division. This allows us to estimate the e®ect of party on each o±ce, as well as the incumbency e®ects. The limitation is that these data are available only over the last two decades and not for all states. The estimated party e®ects and incumbency e®ects for di®erent o±ces are displayed in Figure 7 .
No relationship between party and incumbency e®ects across o±ces is evident. For governor, party has relatively small e®ects and incumbency relatively large e®ects. For the lowest level state executives the opposite pattern holds. However, for most other o±ces, party and incumbency have relatively strong e®ects. The correlation of the e®ects across o±ces is only .007.
From the perspective of existing political science thinking this pattern is quite puzzling.
Party and incumbency are typically viewed as alternative modes of representation and alternative ways of voting. Our data suggest they are not. Were there only two important components of the vote|party and incumbency|there would necessarily be a negative association between these components of the vote. However, there is a third substantial component in our analysis, the residual. And it is large enough to absorb°uctuations in either party or incumbency.
Our evidence suggests that legislative politics, declining party loyalties, and changes in candidate quality are not su±cient to explain the patterns we observe. Clearly, more theoretical and empirical work is needed to identify the causes of rising incumbency advantages.
Discussion
American When incumbents run for statewide o±ces, the outparty will have a relatively di±cult time.
But, when incumbents are not running, either party may be able to win anywhere.
We conclude with a speculative re°ection on the normative importance of incumbency for electoral accountability. The main objection to the incumbency advantage is that it lowers electoral control over the institutions of government. Our data analysis reveals that incumbency is not su±cient to explain the declining marginals in American elections. We have documented that the incumbency advantage has grown for all o±ces, and is at least as large in statewide elective o±ces as in the House. We have also shown (in Figure 1) In AK, HI, ME, NH, and NJ there are no statewide races other than Senate and Governor.
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